100%
|
795楼#
发布于：2015-12-24 05:01
|
|
|
804楼#
发布于：2015-12-24 08:13
|
|
|
806楼#
发布于：2015-12-24 08:52
|
|
名动一方
|
809楼#
发布于：2015-12-24 10:26
Contents
Preface page xi 1 Introduction 1 Empirical psychology and philosophical analysis 2 Metaphysics and the philosophy of mind 3 A brief guide to the rest of this book 6 2 Minds, bodies and people 8 Cartesian dualism 9 The conceivability argument 11 The divisibility argument 13 Non-Cartesian dualism 15 Are persons simple substances? 18 Conceptual objections to dualistic interaction 21 Empirical objections to dualistic interaction 24 The causal closure argument 26 Objections to the causal closure argument 29 Other arguments for and against physicalism 32 Conclusions 36 3 Mental states 39 Propositional attitude states 40 Behaviourism and its problems 41 Functionalism 44 Functionalism and psychophysical identity theories 48 The problem of consciousness 51 Qualia and the inverted spectrum argument 53 Some possible responses to the inverted spectrum argument 55 The absent qualia argument and two notions of consciousness 59 Eliminative materialism and ‘folk psychology’ 61 Some responses to eliminative materialism 64 Conclusions 66 vii viii Contents 4 Mental content 69 Propositions 70 The causal relevance of content 74 The individuation of content 79 Externalism in the philosophy of mind 82 Broad versus narrow content 84 Content, representation and causality 89 Misrepresentation and normality 92 The teleological approach to representation 95 Objections to a teleological account of mental content 99 Conclusions 100 5 Sensation and appearance 102 Appearance and reality 103 Sense-datum theories and the argument from illusion 107 Other arguments for sense-data 110 Objections to sense-datum theories 112 The adverbial theory of sensation 114 The adverbial theory and sense-data 116 Primary and secondary qualities 119 Sense-datum theories and the primary/secondary distinction 121 An adverbial version of the primary/secondary distinction 125 Do colour-properties really exist? 126 Conclusions 128 6 Perception 130 Perceptual experience and perceptual content 131 Perceptual content, appearance and qualia 135 Perception and causation 137 Objections to causal theories of perception 143 The disjunctive theory of perception 145 The computational and ecological approaches to perception 149 Consciousness, experience and ‘blindsight’ 155 Conclusions 158 7 Thought and language 160 Modes of mental representation 162 The ‘language of thought’ hypothesis 164 Analogue versus digital representation 167 Imagination and mental imagery 169 Thought and communication 175 Do animals think? 178 Natural language and conceptual schemes 183 Contents ix Knowledge of language: innate or acquired? 188 Conclusions 191 8 Human rationality and artificial intelligence 193 Rationality and reasoning 194 The Wason selection task 196 The base rate fallacy 200 Mental logic versus mental models 203 Two kinds of rationality 208 Artificial intelligence and the Turing test 209 Searle’s ‘Chinese room’ thought-experiment 214 The Frame Problem 218 Connectionism and the mind 221 Conclusions 227 9 Action, intention and will 230 Agents, actions and events 231 Intentionality 235 The individuation of actions 240 Intentionality again 243 Trying and willing 246 Volitionism versus its rivals 250 Freedom of the will 252 Motives, reasons and causes 257 Conclusions 262 10 Personal identity and self-knowledge 264 The first person 266 Persons and criteria of identity 270 Personal memory 277 Memory and causation 282 Animalism 283 Knowing one’s own mind 288 Moore’s paradox and the nature of conscious belief 291 Externalism and self-knowledge 293 Self-deception 296 Conclusions 297 Bibliography 298 Index 313 Preface At a time when many introductory books on the philosophy of mind are available, it would be fair to ask me why I have written another one. I have at least two answers to this question. One is that some of the more recent introductions to this subject have been rather narrow in their focus, tending to concentrate upon the many different ‘isms’ that have emerged of late – reductionism, functionalism, eliminativism, instrumentalism, non-reductive physicalism and so forth, all of them divisible into further sub-varieties. Another is that I am disturbed by the growing tendency to present the subject in a quasi-scientific way, as though the only proper role for philosophers of mind is to act as junior partners within the wider community of ‘cognitive scientists’. It may be true that philosophers of an earlier generation were unduly dismissive – and, indeed, ignorant – of empirical psychology and neuroscience, but now there is a danger that the pendulum has swung too far in the opposite direction. Perhaps it will be thought that my two answers are in conflict with one another, inasmuch as the current obsession with the different ‘isms’ does at least appear to indicate an interest in the metaphysics of mind, a distinctly philosophical enterprise. But there is no real conflict here, because much of the so-called ‘metaphysics’ in contemporary philosophy of mind is really rather lightweight, often having only a tenuous relation to serious foundational work in ontology. In fact, most of the current ‘isms’ in the philosophy of mind are generated by the need felt by their advocates to propound and justify a broadly physicalist account of the mind and its capaxi xii Preface cities, on the questionable assumption that this alone can render talk about the mind scientifically respectable. Many of the esoteric disputes between philosophers united by this common assumption have arisen simply because it is very unclear just what ‘physicalism’ in the philosophy of mind really entails. In the chapters that follow, I shall try not to let that relatively sterile issue dominate and distort our philosophical inquiries. This book is aimed primarily at readers who have already benefited from a basic grounding in philosophical argument and analysis and are beginning to concentrate in more detail upon specific areas of philosophy, in this case the philosophy of mind. The coverage of the subject is broad but at the same time, I hope, sharply focused and systematic. A start is made with a look at some fundamental metaphysical problems of mind and body, with arguments for and against dualism providing the focus of attention. Then some general theories of the nature of mental states are explained and criticised, the emphasis here being upon the strengths and weaknesses of functionalist approaches. Next we turn to problems concerning the ‘content’ of intentional states of mind, such as the question of whether content can be assigned to mental states independently of the wider physical environments of the subjects whose states they are. In the remaining chapters of the book, attention is focused successively upon more specific aspects of mind and personality: sensation, perception, thought and language, reasoning and intelligence, action and intention, and finally personal identity and self-knowledge. The order in which these topics are covered has been deliberately chosen so as to enable the reader to build upon the understanding gained from earlier chapters in getting to grips with the topics of later chapters. Rather than include separate guides to further reading for the topics covered by the book, I have avoided unnecessary duplication by constructing the notes for each chapter in such a way that they serve this purpose as well as providing references. The book is not partisan, in the sense of espousing an exclusive approach to questions about the mind in general – Preface xiii such as any particular form of physicalism or dualism – but at the same time it does not remain blandly neutral on more specific issues. Developments in empirical psychology are taken into account, but are not allowed to overshadow genuinely philosophical problems. Indeed, my approach is a problem- oriented one, raising questions and possible answers, rather than aiming to be purely instructive. I have xg沅焯 
联系QQ：526781618 淘宝旺旺：跟朝流走 有需要的欢迎联系！专业代购电子书 ebook 英文电子书代购 |
